Chicago Journal of International Law
Volume 22

Number 2

Article 6

7-7-2021

Searching for Justice for Australia’s Stolen Generations
Keila Mayberry

Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Mayberry, Keila (2021) "Searching for Justice for Australia’s Stolen Generations," Chicago Journal of
International Law: Vol. 22: No. 2, Article 6.
Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol22/iss2/6

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please
contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

Searching for Justice for Australia’s Stolen Generations
Keila Mayberry

Abstract
Until the early 1970s, Australian federal and state government agencies forcibly removed
tens of thousands of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children from their families and placed
them up for adoption or in group homes and church missions. These children are known as the
“Stolen Generations.” Domestic remedies have proven insufficient in securing justice for the Stolen
Generations and international adjudication may be a viable alternative. This Comment examines
whether Australia may be haled before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for violations of
the Genocide Convention for its Stolen Generations policies. Australia’s policies likely constituted
a violation of Article II(e) of the Genocide Convention, which prohibits the forcible transfer of
children from one group to another with the intent of destroying the original group. The ICJ would
likely have jurisdiction to hear this claim but would likely rule against the claimant were the
Court to apply its reasoning from prior genocide cases. This is because the ICJ’s genocide
jurisprudence is fundamentally flawed. By setting an unreasonably high bar for proving and
inferring genocidal intent in state responsibility claims, the Court has essentially foreclosed Article
II(e) claims from adjudication, in contravention of the Convention’s object and purpose. This
Comment argues that a claim brought on behalf of the Stolen Generations at the ICJ could correct
the Court’s jurisprudential errors in its application of the Genocide Convention and enable the
Stolen Generations to achieve justice.



J.D. Candidate, 2022, The University of Chicago Law School. The author wishes to thank the entire
Chicago Journal of International Law editorial staff for their extensive review, and Professor Tom
Ginsburg for his advisement.
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I. I NTRODU C TION
From the 1890s to the 1970s,1 Australian state and federal government
agencies forcibly and systematically removed tens of thousands of Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander children from their families.2 Agencies placed these children
up for adoption or put them in group homes and church missions.3 These children
are known as the “Stolen Generations.”4
The forced removal left behind a legacy of trauma that continues today.5
One member of the Stolen Generations, in response to a national inquiry, wrote:
We may go home, but we cannot relive our childhoods. We may reunite with
our mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, aunties, uncles, communities, but we
cannot relive the 20, 30, 40 years that we spent without their love and care,
and they cannot undo the grief and mourning they felt when we were
separated from them. We can go home to ourselves as Aboriginals, but this
does not erase the attacks inflicted on our hearts, minds, bodies and souls, by
caretakers who thought their mission was to eliminate us as Aboriginals. 6

Family ties were often severed in the process. Many, if not most, of the
since-grown children never came to know their birth parents or siblings. 7 The
policies severely disrupted the transmission of First Nations8 culture, leaving the
Stolen Generations “completely disconnected from the communities in which
they were born, undermining their sense of cultural identity.”9

1

2

3
4
5

6

7

Jens Korff, A Guide to Australia’s Stolen Generations, CREATIVE SPIRITS (Nov. 21, 2020),
https://perma.cc/T8AR-9FWX.
Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L
L. 213, 215 (2003); The Stolen Generations, COMMON GROUND, https://perma.cc/4S99-MT7K.
Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 234
Id. See also Korff, supra note 1.
See
The
Stolen
Generations,
AUSTRALIANS
TOGETHER,
https://australianstogether.org.au/discover/australian-history/stolen-generations (last visited Oct.
21, 2021).
HUMAN RIGHTS & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, BRINGING THEM HOME: REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL INQUIRY INTO THE SEPARATION OF ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER
CHILDREN FROM THEIR FAMILIES 11 (1997) [hereinafter BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT].
Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 234.

8

“First Nations” refers to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, and many Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander peoples today prefer the use of this term. See Jeff Korff, What is the Correct
Term for Aboriginal People, CREATIVE SPIRITS, https://perma.cc/U8A8-8SA5; Aboriginal and Torres
Strait
Islander
Peoples,
Style
Manual,
AUSTRALIAN
GOV’T,
https://www.stylemanual.gov.au/accessible-and-inclusive-content/inclusive-language/aboriginaland-torres-strait-islander-peoples (last visited Dec. 20, 2021). However, preferred and acceptable
terminology may be in flux. See generally Researcher’s Note, Australian Aboriginal peoples, BRITANNICA,
https://perma.cc/9JAN-V2MM.

9

Id. at 234–35.
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The removal policies are almost ubiquitously considered part of a shameful
chapter in Australian history.10 A longstanding debate continues on whether, and
to what extent, government actions enforcing these policies amounted to
genocide.11 First Nations Australians who were forcibly removed or had family
members forcibly removed continue to file cases in domestic courts with
lackluster success. Public apologies and reparations schemes have been
incomplete and slow-going.
Although Australia’s forced removal policies were “particularly egregious,
[they were] not unique in kind.”12 The U.S. and Canada, for example, had similar
policies. The U.S. Civilization Fund Act of 1819 allowed Native American
children to be forcibly placed in boarding schools.13 The purported goal of the
Act was to infuse America’s Indigenous population with “good moral character”
and vocational skills.14 One notable general, however, said the policy was actually
intended to “kill the Indian” and “save the man.”15 Children were “virtually
imprisoned in the schools” and experienced a “devastating litany of abuses, from
forced assimilation and grueling labor to widespread sexual and physical abuse.” 16
Some have suggested that the removals qualified as genocide.17 Congress only
outlawed the forced removal of Native American children in the late 1970s.18
In Canada, thousands of First Nations children were taken from their
homes, placed in foster homes, and eventually adopted by white families in
accordance with a series of provincial child welfare policies known as “the Sixties
10

11

12
13

14
15
16

17

18

See, e.g., JOHN STAPLETON, CHAOS AT THE CROSSROADS (2010) (“[the forced removal] policy [is]
now almost universally condemned as one of the darkest stains on the nation’s history, racist and
inhumane”); Frances Mao, Australia’s Apology to Stolen Generations: ‘It Gave Me Peace,’ BBC NEWS (Feb.
13, 2018), https://perma.cc/7Q36-W2US (describing the policies as “a shameful national
chapter”).
See Rosemary Sorensen & Ashleigh Wilson, Stolen Generations Listed as Genocide, AUSTRALIAN (March
24, 2008), https://perma.cc/LB59-MR28.
Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 236.
See Alia Wong, The Schools That Tried—But Failed—to Make Native Americans Obsolete, ATLANTIC (Mar.
5, 2019), https://perma.cc/G92K-XQ4L.
See id.
Id.
Andrea Smith, Soul Wound: The Legacy of Native American Schools, AMNESTY INT’L MAG. (2007),
https://perma.cc/QX49-5XN6.
See, e.g., Angelique Townsend EagleWoman, a professor of law at the University of Idaho, who
suggested that the U.S. government’s forcible removal of Native American children from their tribal
communities, cultures, and nationalities amounted to genocide. Angelique Townsend
EagleWoman, The Ongoing Traumatic Experience of Genocide for American Indians and Alaska Natives in
the United States: The Call to Recognize Full Human Rights as Set Forth in the UN Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples, 3 AM. INDIAN L.J. 424, 445 (2015). See also Donald A. Grinde Jr., Taking the Indian
Out of the Indian: U.S. Policies of Ethnocide through Education, 19 WICAZO SA REV. 2, 25 (2004).
See Wong, supra note 13.
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Scoop.”19 The policies began in the mid-1950s and extended well into the 1980s.20
In addition, from 1883 until 1998, Canada sent over 30% of Indigenous children
to government-sponsored residential schools, where many were physically,
culturally, and sexually abused.21 Over 3,000 students died of mistreatment or
neglect while attending these schools.22 Justice Murray Sinclair, the eventual chair
of the government-established Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada,
wrote that the Indian Residential School policy was “an act of genocide under the
U.N. Convention.”23
This Comment focuses on Australia’s Stolen Generations policies and argues
that the policies give rise to a plausible claim of genocide under Article II(e) of the
1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(“Genocide Convention”).24 Article II(e) states that forcible transfers of children
from one group to another—if committed with the intent to, in whole or in part,
destroy a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group—amount to genocide.25
While haling Australia into the International Court of Justice (ICJ) would be
theoretically possible, the ICJ would likely rule in Australia’s favor based on the
Court’s reasoning in prior genocide cases. This Comment argues that the existing
ICJ caselaw is flawed because the Court: 1) fails to adequately consider relevant
differences between violations of state responsibility and crimes; and 2) imposes
an unnecessarily burdensome standard of proof and test for inferring genocidal
intent in state responsibility cases. As a result, the Court has effectively made
Article II(e) claims impossible to win on the merits, in contravention of the object
and purpose of the Genocide Convention.
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Section II provides a brief history of
the Stolen Generations policies, relevant cases brought in Australian courts, and
attempted non-judicial remedies. This Section also demonstrates that thus far,
domestic attempts to address the injuries of the Stolen Generations have
produced inadequate results. Section III discusses the ICJ’s jurisdiction to hear
claims regarding Australia’s potential breaches of the Genocide Convention.
Section IV summarizes Australia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention

19

Christopher
Dart,
The
Sixties
Scoop
Explained,
CBS
DOCS
POV,
https://www.cbc.ca/cbcdocspov/features/the-sixties-scoop-explained (last visited Dec. 10, 2021).

20

See id.

21

Ian Austen, Canada’s Forced Schooling of Aboriginal Children Was ‘Cultural Genocide,’ Report Finds, N.Y.
TIMES (June 2, 2015), https://perma.cc/584S-M52J.
Id.
David Macdonald, Five Reasons the TRC Chose ‘Cultural Genocide,’ GLOBE & MAIL (July 6, 2015),
https://perma.cc/J2KZ-YVQL.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].

22
23

24

25

Id.
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and the potential merits of the claims that could be brought on behalf of the Stolen
Generations at the ICJ. Finally, by analyzing how the Stolen Generations claims
would be resolved under the Court’s existing standards for genocidal intent,
Section V highlights deficiencies in, and recommends changes be made to, the
ICJ’s genocide jurisprudence.

II. F AC TU AL B AC KGROU ND
A. Historical Overview of Stolen Generations Policies
British settlement of Australia dates back to 1788 and, as was typical of
colonial histories, the mistreatment of Indigenous peoples began shortly
thereafter.26 A large number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples were
killed by disease and conflict during the “pacification by force” period, which
extended into the 1880s.27 In Australia’s southeast, the Aboriginal population
declined so rapidly that it was commonly believed that they would soon die out.28
Other First Nations Australians were driven to the bush or left in settlements on
the fringes of cities and towns, compelled to join Australia’s labor force.29 In New
South Wales in the 1790s and in Tasmania in the 1810s, private individuals began
separating First Nations children from their families.30
Forced separation did not become a governmental process until the
twentieth century, when “it was much more serious—on a much larger scale.”31
“Governments had assumed that Aborigines were dying out—that evolution had
dictated that they would eventually disappear,” said Australian historian Henry
Reynolds.32 “The number of what they called ‘full-blooded Aborigines’ was
declining. It appeared to be proving their scientific theories.”33 Eugenics had
gained popularity in the country around this period.34 Its basic premise was that
“through breeding” and removing “bad characteristics,” the “race of the nation”
would be “improve[d].”35 In Australia, eugenics often took the form of trying to
“breed out the color.”36 Those First Nations peoples with at least some European

28

See Robert Tonkinson, The
https://perma.cc/2L3A-3MG9.
Id.
See id.

29

See id.

30

35

See STOLEN GENERATIONS at 01:02–01:12 (Ronin Films 2000), https://perma.cc/9MR4-XTR8.
Id. at 01:21–01:29.
Id. at 01:32–01:40.
Id. at 01:40–01:49.
See id. at 05:15–05:22.
Id. at 05:21–05:29.

36

Id. at 05:37–05:42.

26

27

31
32
33
34

Europeans,

Australian
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“blood” were seen as having value to non-Indigenous society, particularly as a
cheap labor source.37 If children of mixed descent could be removed from their
families and communities and sent to white communities, it was thought that over
time the mixed-descent population would “merge” with the non-Indigenous
population.38
Eugenics took hold in high levels of Australian political society. In 1937, A.
O. Neville, Western Australia’s Chief Protector of Aborigines,39 believed “the pure
black” would be extinct within the century but that the “half-caste problem”—
referencing those with mixed Indigenous and European heritage—was only
increasing year over year.40 Neville reportedly viewed “[t]he pure blooded
Aboriginal [as] not a quick breeder, . . . [but the] half-caste was.”41 Neville’s
solution, according to Brisbane’s Telegraph newspaper, was to segregate “pure
blacks,” who were beyond saving, and “absorb the half-castes,” who could shed
their Aboriginal identity and be accepted into white society.42 In 1933, Dr. Cecil
Cook, the Chief Protector of Aborigines for the Northern Territory,43 said:
Generally, by the fifth and invariably by the sixth generation, all native
characteristics of the Australian aborigine are eradicated. The problem of our
half-castes will quickly be eliminated by the complete disappearance of the
black race, and the swift submergence of their progeny in the white . . . . The

37
38
39

40
41
42
43

BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
Id.
The Chief Protector of Aborigines—an official position that existed in Western Australia from
1898 until 1936—served as the legal guardian of every Aboriginal child under the age of sixteen in
the state. Chief Protector of Aborigines (1898 – 1936), FIND & CONNECT RES. PROJECT
COMMONWEALTH AUSTL. (Jan. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/6MTK-3RW2. The Chief Protector had
the power to remove Aboriginal children from their homes to place them in group homes or in
“service” (work). Id. The role became the Commissioner for Native Affairs in 1936, and then
Commissioner of Native Welfare in 1954, before being abolished in 1972. Commissioner of Native
Welfare (1954 – 1972), FIND & CONNECT RES. PROJECT COMMONWEALTH AUSTL. (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://perma.cc/H9Z8-QQBJ. Neville served as the state’s Chief Protector and then
Commissioner for Native Affairs for thirty-five years, from 1915 to 1940. Auber O. Neville,
EUGENICS ARCHIVE, https://perma.cc/K2M9-9PPD.
BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 24.
Id.
Id.
The Chief Protector of Aborigines was an official position in the Northern Territory from 1911 to
1939, before being replaced by the Director of Native Affairs in 1939 and then the Director of
Welfare in 1953. Chief Protector of Aborigines, Northern Territory (1911 – 1939), FIND & CONNECT RES.
PROJECT COMMONWEALTH AUSTL. (May 9, 2014), https://perma.cc/P58G-HNRR; Director of
Welfare (1953 – 1970), FIND & CONNECT RES. PROJECT COMMONWEALTH AUSTL. (Oct. 11, 2017),
https://perma.cc/3NNG-QA4Q. The Protector was the legal guardian of every Aboriginal child
in the State. Chief Protector of Aborigines, Northern Territory (1911 – 1939), FIND & CONNECT RES.
PROJECT COMMONWEALTH AUSTL. (May 9, 2014), https://perma.cc/P58G-HNRR. Dr. Cecil Cook
served as the Chief Protector for twelve years, from 1927 to 1939. Tony Austin, Cecil Cook, Scientific
Thought and ‘Half-Castes’ in the Northern Territory 1927-1939, in 14 ABORIGINAL HISTORY 1 (1990).
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Australian native is the most easily assimilated race on earth, physically and
mentally. 44

By 1911, almost all Australian states had protectionist legislation that granted
the state’s Chief Protector or Aboriginal Protection Board extensive powers to
control First Nations peoples.45 Some states—including Western Australia and the
Northern Territory—granted the Chief Protector legal guardianship over all
Aboriginal children, displacing the rights of parents.46 Other states, such as New
South Wales, allowed First Nations children to be removed from their homes
without the state proving what was typically required under general welfare
legislation: the child’s “neglect,” “destitut[ution],” or “uncontrollab[ility].”47
State governments strictly regulated First Nations marriage rights,
employment decisions, and movements within and outside of reserves.48
Government-appointed managers or missionaries ran reserves, and police officers
enforced protectionist policies at the local level.49 First Nations children were
housed in dormitories, and their contact with their families was strictly limited as
states attempted to distance children from their First Nations “lifestyles” and
encourage them to convert to Christianity.50 One Aboriginal woman, Sheila
Humphries, told her story of being placed in a Catholic orphanage by her mother
at age four.51 Sheila’s mother believed the orphanage would be the best place for
Humphries and her six-year-old sister to be educated.52 When Sheila was eight
44

BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 118. See also Caught up in a Scientific Racism Designed
to Breed out the Black, SYDNEY MORNING HERALD (Feb. 14, 2008), https://perma.cc/9LTY-7XSV.

45

BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 23. Tasmania, which did not have this specific
kind of legislation, effectively segregated First Nations families from white society, having removed
most First Nations families to Cape Barren Island before the turn of the twentieth century. Id. First
Nations families living on the Island were left relatively undisturbed until the 1930s, when the state
began using general child welfare legislation to remove First Nations children from the islands and
send them to non-Indigenous institutions and foster families. Id. at 26. Until the 1960s, the
Tasmanian government denied even having an Aboriginal population, claiming to have only had
some “half-caste people.” Id. at 23.
See Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 235. BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 23.
BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 27. Some states—like Victoria—changed the
definition of “Aboriginal.” By increasing the threshold proportion of First Nations “blood” for
someone to qualify as Aboriginal, Aboriginals with sufficiently European heritage were excluded
from the right to live on reservations. As a result, a number of mixed-race children were cut off
from their communities. Id. at 25.

46
47

48
49
50
51

52

See id. at 23.
See id.
Id.
See Sheila Humphries, My Stolen Childhood, and a Life to Rebuild, TEDX PERTH (Nov. 2017),
https://perma.cc/9DN6-SNMZ; Lucy Jarvis, Nyoongar Artist Sheila Humphries Shares Stories of the
Stolen Generations with Mindarie Students, N. COAST TIMES (Aug. 17, 2016), https://perma.cc/E4XMSSYR.
See Humphries, supra note 51.
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years old, her mother, no longer believing the education to be adequate, attempted
to pull Sheila and her sister out of the orphanage.53 The moment Sheila and her
sister left the orphanage, the Western Australian police issued a state alert calling
for their arrest.54 Sheila and her sister were eventually seized by the police and
taken back to the orphanage.55 Sheila, like many First Nations children during this
period, never saw her mother again.56
Assimilation went from being an ad hoc state-by-state policy to an official
national policy during the first Commonwealth-State Native Welfare Conference
in 1937.57 The Conference concluded that the “destiny of the natives of aboriginal
origin, but not of the full blood, lies in ultimate absorption . . . with a view to their
taking their place in the white community on an equal footing with the whites.”58
Where “merging” was essentially a passive process of nudging Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander peoples towards integration and denying their communities
government assistance communities, assimilation59 was a “highly intensive process
necessitating constant surveillance” until First Nations peoples could be ensured
to be sufficiently European.60
At the third Native Welfare Conference in September of 1951, Paul Hasluck,
the newly appointed federal Minister for Territories, acknowledged that
Australia’s treatment of First Nations peoples was making a mockery of Australia’s
promotion of human rights at the international level.61 Australian states agreed to
take a more unified approach to their welfare policies.62 In a seemingly revisionist
manner, they agreed that the goal of “native welfare measures” was assimilation:
“[a]ssimilation means, in practical terms, that, in the course of time, it is expected

53
54
55
56
57

58

59

60
61
62

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 26 (the conference resolved that “efforts of all
State authorities should be directed towards the education of children of mixed aboriginal blood at
white standards, and their subsequent employment under the same conditions as whites with a view
to their taking their place in the white community on an equal footing with the whites”).
Id. Neville’s model of “absorption” referred to biological integration of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Australians into white Australian society. Id. at 27.
Assimilation refers to a social-cultural model of integrating First Nations peoples into white society.
Id. at 27.
Id.
Id. at 28.
See Verbatim Record of Proceedings, Native Welfare Conference, 177 (Jan. 26–27, 1961) (Austl.),
https://aiatsis.gov.au/sites/default/files/catalogue_resources/20782.pdf
(the
conference
concluded the need for the adoption of national policies and closer cooperation among Australian
Governments in all aspects of native welfare).
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that all persons of aboriginal blood or mixed blood in Australia will live like other
white Australians do.”63
Other states adopted New South Wales’s 1940s approach to Indigenous
welfare: instead of removing Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children
without cause, children were to be removed according to general child welfare
laws, which required a court’s determination of neglect, destitution, or
uncontrollability of the child.64 In practice, “[s]tate government child welfare
practice[s] [were] marked more by continuity than change.”65 Perhaps
counterintuitively, even more Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children were
removed from their families under the guise of assimilation in the 1950s and 1960s
than were removed in prior decades.66 So many children were removed from their
homes that institutions housing First Nations children could not keep up with the
influx.67 As a result, these children were increasingly placed with non-Indigenous
foster families, where their identities were further denied or disparaged.68
By the 1960s, assimilation was clearly not occurring, in spite of government
efforts to encourage it.69 Discrimination by non-Indigenous individuals and the
resilience of First Nations peoples in maintaining their cultures thwarted efforts
at assimilation and cultural erasure.70 The political landscape had also changed.71
In 1967, the Constitution was amended to include Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples in the census for the first time and grant the Commonwealth
joint control with states over Aboriginal affairs.72 The Commonwealth increased
funding for First Nations welfare programs and established a national Office of
Aboriginal Affairs.73 With greater access to funding and the support of legal
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

72

73

BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 28.
See id. at 27.
Id.
See id. at 28.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 29.
See, e.g., Commonwealth, Native Welfare Conference, House of Representatives, 20 April 1961
(George Nelson, Representative for the Northern Territory) (Austl.), https://perma.cc/EK6RWEDT (“[T]he eyes of the world are shifting from the South African episode [which was in the
midst of Apartheid] to our own country and its policies. In particular, we want to see, at this stage,
something concrete emerging from conferences of this nature, so that we can reassure not only our
own people in Australia but also the rest of the world, that we are in earnest when we say we are
doing our utmost as a nation to assist our native people.”).
BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 29; The 1967 Referendum, Australians Together
(Nov.
17,
2020),
https://australianstogether.org.au/discover/australian-history/1967referendum/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2021).
See BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 29.
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services, First Nations communities began to challenge removal orders, which
restricted the number of forced removals that otherwise would have been able to
take place.74 By 1969, all states had repealed their statutes that allowed for the
permissive removal75 of First Nations children from their homes.
Between one-tenth and one-third of First Nations children are estimated to
have been forcibly removed from their families and their communities from 1910
to 1970.76 The effects of removal have been devastating. A study conducted in
Melbourne during the 1980s found that those removed were much less likely than
First Nations children who were raised by their families or communities to have
stable living conditions, were three times as likely to say that they had no one to
call in a crisis and were twice as likely to report current use of illicit substances.77
They also were “less likely to have a strong sense of their Aboriginal cultural
identity, were more likely to have discovered their Aboriginality later in life[,] and
[were] less likely to [have] know[n] [ ] their Aboriginal cultural traditions.”78
A national study conducted by the Australian Bureau of Statistics in 1994
found that First Nations peoples who had been separated as children, compared
with those who had not, were significantly more likely to have been arrested and
to report having worse health outcomes.79 The study suggested that
institutionalization had measurable damaging effects on the emotional
development and sense of self-worth of those who had been separated.80
In 1997, the Australian Human Rights Commission, an independent body
established by the Australian Government, delivered the landmark Bringing Them
Home Report.81 The report was the result of a national inquiry into the Stolen
Generations policies and was a “significant milestone” in recording the
testimonies of members of Stolen Generations.82 The report notably concluded
that:
74

See id.

75

That is, administrative removal pursuant to broad grants of discretion, see id. at 226 (listing statutory
sources granting agents fiduciary obligations that allowed them to remove children for, among other
things, their “moral, intellectual, and physical welfare,” and “care, custody, and education”), and
sometimes not even subject to prior judicial scrutiny, see id. at 220–21.
The number of Indigenous children who were forcibly removed is difficult to estimate with
precision. Records have been lost or destroyed, and many surviving records fail to document the
Aboriginality of the removed children. Id. at 30–31.

76

77
78
79
80
81

82

Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. at 12–14.
See id.
See generally BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6. See also About, AUSTRALIAN HUM. RTS.
COMM’N, https://humanrights.gov.au/about (last visited Dec. 14, 2021).
ABORIGINAL AND TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER HEALING FOUNDATION, BRINGING THEM HOME 20
YEARS ON: AN ACTION PLAN FOR HEALING 4, 6 (2017).
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The Australian practice of Indigenous child removal involved both systematic
racial discrimination and genocide as defined by international law. Yet it
continued to be practised as official policy long after being clearly prohibited
by treaties to which Australia had voluntarily subscribed. 83

The finding of genocide has attracted particular controversy and will be further
examined in Section IV.B.

B. Disappointing Results of Stolen Generations Claims in
Australian Courts
Australia’s highest court, the High Court of Australia, deliberated on a
genocide claim in Kruger v Commonwealth.84 The 1997 case was the first brought by
members of the Stolen Generations in Australian courts.85 Kruger concerned a
constitutional challenge to the Northern Territory’s Aboriginals Ordinance of
1918.86 The ordinance allowed the Northern Territory’s Chief Protector to
forcibly remove “Aboriginal or half-caste” children from their families and place
them in Aboriginal institutions and reserves.87 Child removals pursuant to the
Aboriginals Ordinance of 1918 occurred between 1925 and 1949, with the last
Aboriginal detention ending in 1960.88 The plaintiffs, who were children or the
parents of children removed from their homes, challenged the ordinance’s
constitutional validity on various grounds, including the implied constitutional
right to be free from genocide.89
The High Court rejected the claims on all grounds.90 On the right to be free
from genocide, only three of the six judges addressed the existence of such a right,
with one judge finding that the right existed and the other two reaching the
opposite conclusion.91 But all judges, relying on the definition of genocide
provided by the Genocide Convention, held that the Ordinance did not authorize
acts of genocide.92 Specifically, the Court found that the powers bestowed by the

83
84
85
86
87
88
89

90
91

92

BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 231.
(1997) 146 ALR 126 (Austl.).
See Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 238.
Kruger, 146 ALR at 133, 266.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 143.
See id. at 172. See also Chris Cunneen & Julia Grix, The Limitations of Litigation in Stolen Generations
Cases, 15 AUSTL. INST. ABORIGINAL & TORRES STRAIT ISLANDER STUD. RSCH. DISCUSSION PAPER
1, 7 (2004).
See Kruger, 146 ALR at 245–46.
Sarah Joseph, Kruger v Commonwealth: Constitutional Rights and the Stolen Generations, 24 MONASH
U. L. REV. 487, 495–96 (1998).
See Cunneen & Grix, supra note 89, at 12. The Genocide Convention will be discussed in depth in
Section IV.
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Ordinance were required to be exercised in the best interests of those concerned
and the Aboriginal population more broadly.93 Therefore, genocidal intent was not
met.94 The Court concluded that:
the measures contemplated by the legislation of which the plaintiffs complain
would appear to have been ill-advised or mistaken, particularly by
contemporary standards. However, a shift in view upon the justice or morality
of those measures taken under an Ordinance which was repealed over 40
years ago does not itself point to the constitutional invalidity of that
legislation. 95

Kruger faced criticism. The policies at issue had continued well past World
War II. Genocide, including forced child transfer, was contrary to international
law even “according to the prevailing contemporary legal values of the time.” 96
Eugenic practices were especially rejected as legally valid after World War II, when
the horrors justified by the theory were on full display.97 Therefore, the Court’s
finding that the Northern Territory’s government had acted with good intentions
according to prevailing moral views at the time was arguably misguided—the
policy was considered wrong, and could be considered illegal, even when it was
enacted.98 The Court privileged a history of justification, a defense of colonial
history, over the history of harm experienced by First Nations Australians.99
Regarding the Court’s legal interpretation, some have criticized the High
Court as misunderstanding the Genocide Convention’s group protections in this
case:
[T]he Genocide Convention does not just protect individuals or the racial
groups to which they belong; it protects groups “as separate and distinct
entities.” . . . [G]roup destruction can never be in the interests of the affected
group itself, which according to the Genocide Convention holds a right of
and interest in its own existence. 100

93
94
95
96

97
98
99
100

See Kruger, 146 ALR at 111.
See id.
Id. at 147.
Cunneen & Grix, supra note 89, at 25. See, e.g., United States v. Greifelt (the RuSHA case), 5 TRIALS
OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL
LAW NO. 10, at 674 (1950) (Military Tribunal, Nuremburg, Germany, Oct. 1946–Apr. 1949)
[hereinafter Greifelt]; In re Greiser, 13 ANN. DIG. & REPORTS OF PUBLIC INT'L L. CASES 387, 389 (H.
Lauterpacht ed., 1946) (decision of the Supreme National Tribunal, Posman, Poland) (first
international convictions for genocide, including acts of forcible child transfer).
Cf. Cunneen & Grix, supra note 89, at 25.
See id.
See id.
Kurt Mundorff, Other Peoples’ Children: A Textual and Contextual Interpretation of the Genocide Convention,
Article 2(e), 50 HARV. INT'L L.J. 61, 118–19 (2009).
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While Kruger was disappointing, its dampening effect on Stolen Generations
litigation was limited: the case only decided the specific validity of the Ordinance
and not the validity of similar governmental exercises of power in practice.101
In Nulyarimma v Thompson102 in 1999, the Federal Court of Australia103 held
that “in the absence of appropriate legislation, [genocide is not] cognisable in an
Australian court.”104 The Federal Court, however, agreed that genocide gave rise
to a “non-derogatable obligation by each nation State to the entire international
community.”105 Furthermore, it concluded that Australia is bound under
international law for the crime of genocide through its treaty obligations and
responsibility not to commit jus cogens violations.106
With genocide being ruled incognizable in Australian courts, later claims
have had to rely on state tort claims rather than on the Genocide Convention.107
Courts continue to foreclose remedies for victims by failing to hold governments
liable for Stolen Generations policies—the basic finding that these policies were
enacted under good intentions remains undisturbed.108 Moreover, actions in tort
give rise to statute of limitations issues that compound the evidentiary, financial,
and emotional barriers claimants face in bringing suits.109
Cubillo v Commonwealth110 was the first civil damages suit brought on Stolen
Generations claims.111 Like Kruger, it was based on the 1918 Aboriginals
Ordinance. Lorna Cubillo and Peter Gunner, the plaintiffs,
were removed as young children from their families and communities. They
were taken hundreds of kilometers from the countries of their birth. They
were prevented from returning. They were made to live among strangers, in
a strange place, in institutions which bore no resemblance to a home. They
lost, by the actions of the Commonwealth, the chance to grow among the
101
102
103

104
105

106
107

See Joseph, supra note 91, at 495.
(1999) 165 ALR 621 (Austl.).
The Federal Court is a superior court of record and sits below the High Court in the hierarchy of
Australia’s federal courts.
Nulyarimma, 165 ALR at 627.
Id. at 627. See also id. at 655 (“[A]lthough the ratification of the treaty does not incorporate it into
Australian domestic law as such, it is nevertheless confirmation of Australia's recognition of the
status of genocide as a universal crime under international law.”).
See id. at 632, 655.
See generally Cunneen & Grix, supra note 89, at 5.

110

See Amelia E. Noble, An Unnecessary Hindrance? A Critical Examination of the Appropriateness of Statutory
Limitation Periods in Stolen Generations Compensation Claims, 8 ANU UNDERGRADUATE RSCH. J. 105
(2016). Julie Cassidy, Unhelpful and Inappropriate?: The Question of Genocide and the Stolen Generations, 13
AUSTL. INDIGENOUS L. REV. 114, 119 (2009).
See Maithri Panagoda, The Stolen Generations: A Struggle for Justice, MONDAQ (Feb. 9, 2017),
https://perma.cc/GJP2-U68L.
[No. 2] (2000) 174 ALR 97 (Austl.).

111

See Starr & Brilmayer, supra note 2, at 239.
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109
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warmth of their own people, speaking their people’s languages and learning
about their country. They suffered lasting psychiatric injury. They were
treated as orphans when they were not orphans. They lost the culture and
traditions of their families. 112

Cubillo and Gunner claimed that their removals amounted to wrongful
imprisonments and deprivations of liberty.113 They alleged that the statutory
duties, duties of care, and fiduciary duties owed to them by the Commonwealth
and the Northern Territory Director of Native Affairs had been breached.114 The
Federal Court did not sway from the Australian judiciary’s original position,
referring to the removals as serving a legitimate “welfare and protection” policy
that, though “badly misguided,” was “well-meaning.”115
Even in Trevorrow v South Australia,116 a 2007 case in which the state
government was held vicariously liable in tort for the harm it had caused the
plaintiff by its removal policy, South Australia’s Supreme Court accepted the
benevolent intent of the lawmakers.117
Trevorrow did not mark a new era in providing compensation for Stolen
Generations plaintiffs. A few years later, in what was considered a “landmark
Stolen Generations test case,” the Collards, a Western Australian couple who had
nine children removed from their care in the 1950s and 60s, lost their bid for
compensation.118 The Supreme Court of Western Australia held that the “evidence
did not support the conclusion that when the Children were made wards, that that
action was carried out in the pursuit of a policy of assimilation, of the kind

112
113
114
115

116

117

118

Cubillo, 174 ALR at 114.
See id. at 102.
See id. at 101–02.
Id. at 154, 484, 581. See also Williams v Minister, Aboriginal Land Rights Act 1983 [1994] 35 NSWLR
497 (Austl.); Claim of Valerie Linow (Victims of Crime Compensation Tribunal, New South Wales,
File Reference 73123, 15 February 2002) (Austl.).
[No. 5] [2007] SASC 285 (Austl.). In this case, the plaintiff, Bruce Allan Trevorrow, was removed
from his parents at one years old by the Aborigines Protection Board of South Australia (APB) and
sent to live with a foster family until the age of ten. His biological mother repeatedly requested that
the APB return her son. Eventually, the APB complied. The plaintiff remained with his family for
the next fourteen months, before spending the remainder of his childhood in and out of State
institutions to treat a range of emotional and physical problems associated with his separation. The
removal of Trevorrow from his parents was held to have been ultra vires, and the State was held
responsible vicariously for the misfeasance and wrongful imprisonment perpetrated by its agents,
as well as directly for breaching its fiduciary duties and the standard of care owed to Trevorrow. Id.
See id. ¶ 53; Randall Kune, The Stolen Generations in Court: Explaining the Lack of Widespread Successful
Litigation by Members of the Stolen Generations, 30 U. TASMANIA L. REV. 32, 43 (2011).
Landmark Stolen Generations Test Case Begins in Perth, ABORIGINAL LEGAL SERVICE OF WESTERN
AUSTL. (Feb. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/VWY9-SAC3. Collard v State of Western Australia [No. 4]
[2013] WASC 455 (2013) (Austl.).
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described by counsel for the plaintiffs.”119 Instead, the removal decisions had been
based on a finding of neglect in accordance with general child welfare legislation.120
Litigation efforts remain ongoing.121 With limited success to date, and with
the time horizon between the Stolen Generations policies and domestic
adjudication only widening, First Nations Australians have effectively exhausted
domestic judicial remedies.

C. Late Public Apologies and Reparation Attempts
The Bringing Them Home report122 recommended that Australian state
parliaments officially acknowledge and apologize for the forcible removal policies
and actions of their predecessors and make reparations to the Stolen
Generations.123
Though states and territories swiftly issued formal apologies,124 the national
response was disheartening. Prime Minister John Howard, in his own words,
“apologise[d] in a sense” by delivering a statement of regret to Parliament.125 But
Howard refused to accept the conclusion of the report that a genocide had
occurred against Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. “I didn’t believe
genocide had taken place,” Howard said in 2014, adding, “I still don’t.”126
It wasn’t until 2008, twenty-one years after the release of the Bringing Them
Home report, that the federal government issued a formal apology. Prime Minister
Keven Rudd apologized for the “profound grief, suffering and loss” inflicted on
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples by the laws and policies of
Australian governments, especially apologizing for the removal of children from

119
120

121

122
123
124

125

126

Id. at ¶ 14.
See id. But see supra Section II.A, which discusses how Indigenous children were more permissively
removed from their homes under general child welfare policies than non-Indigenous children.
See, e.g., Cameron Gooley, Northern Territory Stolen Generations Compensation Calls Grow Ahead of Possible
Class Action, ABC NEWS (Oct. 6, 2020), https://perma.cc/5WTJ-9YMS.
See discussion supra Section II.A.
BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 246.
See Bringing Them Home: Apologies by State and Territory Parliaments 2008, AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMM’N,
https://humanrights.gov.au/our-work/bringing-them-home-apologies-state-and-territoryparliaments-2008 (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
Helen Davidson, John Howard: There Was No Genocide Against Indigenous Australians, GUARDIAN (Sept.
22, 2014), https://perma.cc/FN48-CFAT (“‘I did apologise in a sense; I delivered a statement of
regret to the parliament,’ Howard said. ‘But it’s very easy to apologise for other people’s
mistakes.’”).
Id. See also Shuba Krishnan, John Howard Has Criticized Kevin Rudd’s 2008 Apology to the Stolen
Generations, SBS NEWS (Jan. 1, 2022), https://perma.cc/A9WM-FHEN (“Former prime minister
John Howard says the national apology to the Stolen Generations was ‘meaningless’ and he stands
by his decision not to consider a treaty with Indigenous Australians”).
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their families.127 He did not address the issue of genocide, or even “cultural
genocide.”128 The apology was an important step in national reconciliation, but
the long delay between the end of forcible removals and meaningful government
acknowledgement, as well as the lack of full acknowledgement of the genocidal
nature of these policies, left much to be desired. Moreover, progress since this
apology by way of concrete policy changes has been modest.129
For example, reparations have largely not been implemented, even though
their distribution would indicate to many victims “a genuine commitment to
addressing the harm propagated by the government, more so than the public
apology.”130 The federal government has largely deflected responsibility for
compensation to churches and state government welfare agencies.131 Some
states—Tasmania, South Australia, New South Wales, and Victoria—have
adopted some redress for members of the Stolen Generations.132 However, these
schemes have been slow to start and have generally made “patchy offerings.” 133
Victoria, which created its first compensation scheme in 2020, offered AUD $10
million for the approximately 1,000 survivors in the state—about AUD $10,000
per person;134 this is deficiently low. For context, Bruce Trevorrow, the plaintiff
in Trevorrow,135 received an AUD $525,000 compensation order for the harms the
state had inflicted on him by his forced removal.136

127
128

129

130

National Apology, NAT’L MUSEUM AUSTL. (Mar. 13, 2020), https://perma.cc/3MAC-UJYM.
Id. Cultural genocide refers to a long-term, intergenerational process of destroying a human group,
mainly through assimilationist and “dispersionist” policies. ELISA N OVIC, THE CONCEPT OF
CULTURAL GENOCIDE: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW PERSPECTIVE 5 (2016). Though originally
conceived by Raphael Lemkin—who coined the term genocide—as being “centre stage” to the
crime of genocide, cultural genocide—after significant debate—was excluded from the Genocide
Convention. See Leora Bilsky & Rachel Klagsbrun, The Return of Cultural Genocide?, 29 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 2, 373–74, 376, 389 (2018). As such, cultural genocide is not prohibited by the Genocide
Convention and does not induce liability under the Convention’s provisions.
Cf. Daniella Stoltz & Beth Van Schaack, It’s Never Too Late to Say “I’m Sorry”: Sovereign Apologies Over
the Years, JUST SEC. (Mar. 16, 2021), https://perma.cc/6LMK-VFD8; National Stolen Generations
Reparations Scheme
Needed, AUSTL. HUM. RTS. COMM’N (Nov. 21,
2017),
https://humanrights.gov.au/about/news/media-releases/national-stolen-generations-reparationsscheme-needed (last visited Dec. 20. 2021).
Stoltz & Van Schaack, supra note 129.

135

See Calla Wahlquist, ‘Unfinished Business’ of Stolen Generations Puts More Children at Risk – Report,
GUARDIAN (May 22, 2017), https://perma.cc/2JL7-QSS5.
See James Rischbieth, Redress for Stolen-Generations Victims in the State of Victoria, Australia, LEUVEN
TRANSITIONAL JUST. BLOG (July 1, 2020), https://perma.cc/X5TE-2T3Z; Gooley, supra note 121.
Calla Wahlquist, Rudd’s Apology, 10 Years On: the Elusive Hope of a ‘Breakthrough Moment,’ GUARDIAN
(Feb. 11, 2018), http://perma.cc/5A5H-CXDV.
Rischbieth, supra note 132.
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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Rischbieth, supra note 132.
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Western Australia and Queensland provided general compensation funds for
those subjected to child abuse while in state care, rather than the Stolen
Generations specifically. In Western Australia, half the claimants for the scheme
were members of the Stolen Generations.137 Western Australia’s scheme
specifically was criticized as being “outrageously low” when it initially offered an
AUD $80,000 maximum per person.138 The payout was then slashed to AUD
$45,000 per person in 2009 for budgetary reasons, “retraumatizing [ ] victims.”139
The Northern Territory had no applicable compensatory system for
members of the Stolen Generations until August 2021.140 The scheme suffers the
“same fatal flaw as similar schemes in other states in that not every eligible person
will qualify”; most survivors, lacking state documentation of their custodial time,
are estimated to be ineligible.141 Additionally, it offers up to only AUD $75,000
per person.142
The delay in declaratory and compensatory relief suggests the importance of
turning to international fora for the full acknowledgement of the genocidal acts
against the Stolen Generations. Moreover, turning to the international stage would
draw attention to the need for the Australian government to financially
compensate the still relatively recent, and still largely unremedied, harms of its
forced removal policies.

III. J U RISDIC TION OF AND R E LIEF C LAIME D AT THE
I NTE RNATION AL C OU RT OF J U STICE
The domestic legal framework for bringing forth genocide claims is limited,
litigation results have been disappointing, and the non-judicial remedies have been
delayed and deficient. The Stolen Generations and their families have exhausted
avenues for domestic recourse143 and have yet to receive justice. Given that there

137

138
139
140

141
142

143

Victoria Laurie, Redress Payment Mistake Could Be Repeated, Stolen Generations Members Warn,
AUSTRALIAN (Dec. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/QZF6-DGP3.
Id.
Id.
Peter Read & Lizzie May, The Government’s Stolen Generations Redress Scheme is Piecemeal and Unrealistic,
CONVERSATION (Aug. 29, 2021), https://perma.cc/4SML-MYG2.
Id.
Cameron Gooley, Territory Stolen Generations Survivors to Share $380 Million Reparation Scheme, SYDNEY
MORNING HERALD (Aug. 5, 2021), https://perma.cc/72L8-XFE2.
The general requirement that local remedies be exhausted before a complaint be brought forth for
international adjudication is not legally relevant for Stolen Generations claims brought at the ICJ.
The applicant bringing the claims would be a nation state, and state-to-state claims are accepted as
being excluded from the exhaustion requirement, see Tamás Kende, Distant Cousins: The Exhaustion
of Local Remedies in Customary International Law and in the European Human Rights Contexts, ELITE L.J.
127, 130 (2020), as they cannot meaningfully be pursued in domestic courts.
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is a plausible claim of genocide, the Stolen Generations should attempt to secure
redress at the International Court of Justice.

A. The ICJ Has Jurisdiction to Hear Stolen Generations Claims
Australia has broadly accepted the jurisdiction of the ICJ. Article 36 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that States Parties may
declare that they recognize as “compulsory ipso facto and without special
agreement” the jurisdiction of the Court in all disputes concerning “the
interpretation of a treaty,” “any question of international law,” “the existence of
any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international
obligation,” and “the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach
of an international obligation.”144 Australia agreed to this provision without any
reservations, understandings, or declarations (RUDs) from 1954 until 2002. 145
Before 1954, and even before the establishment of the ICJ in 1945, Australia
recognized the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and its predecessor, the
Permanent Court of International Justice.146 Since 2002, Australia has continued
to recognize compulsory jurisdiction but has stipulated that countries bringing
cases against Australia must demonstrate a commitment to the process of
compulsory jurisdiction.147 For an applicant state to demonstrate this
commitment, Australia requires the applicant to have accepted compulsory
jurisdiction for at least one year prior to the filing of the dispute’s application and
to have done so in whole rather than for the purposes of a particular dispute.148
The seventy-four countries accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction would
accordingly qualify to bring forth a claim against Australia.149
The Court specifically has jurisdiction to hear claims arising from Australia’s
obligations under the Genocide Convention. The Genocide Convention was
“intended to confirm obligations that already existed in customary international
law”;150 however, jurisdiction of the Court may only be “based on the consent of

144

145

146
147

148
149

150

Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 36, ¶ 2, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 33 U.N.T.S.
993 [hereinafter ICJ Statute].
See generally Australia’s Declarations Recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice, UNIV. OF MELB., https://perma.cc/CRY9-C3JN.
Id.
Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory: Australia, INT’L CT. OF JUST.
(Mar. 21, 2002), https://perma.cc/A2PZ-MBEA.
See id.
Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, INT’L CT. OF JUST.,
https://perma.cc/8NG2-YKZN.
See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Croat. v. Serb.), Judgment, 2015 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 95 (Feb. 3) [hereinafter Croatia-Serbia Genocide case].
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the parties.”151 The ICJ can only hear genocide claims if the respondent state has
provided for jurisdiction through Article IX of the Genocide Convention. 152
Australia ratified the Convention without any RUDs that would otherwise
interfere with the ICJ’s ability to adjudicate a genocide dispute.153 Australia was an
early supporter of the Convention; it ratified the Genocide Convention on July 8,
1949,154 and the Convention officially entered into force on January 12, 1951. 155
In sum, because Australia is bound to uphold the Genocide Convention, and
Australia has consented to ICJ jurisdiction in general and for Convention claims
specifically, the Court has the jurisdictional basis to hear claims against Australia
arising under the Convention.

B. An Applicant State Would Have Standing
The Stolen Generations would need an applicant state to sponsor their
claims as only states may be parties in cases before the ICJ.156 A state that meets
Australia’s requirements for bringing suit against Australia—acceptance of
compulsory jurisdiction for a sufficient amount of a time and in whole157—would
have standing to bring a claim on behalf of the Stolen Generations.
States parties have standing to bring claims for violations of erga omnes
(“towards all”) obligations, even in the absence of direct harms.158 States typically,
as a matter of practice, bring claims when directly injured.159 However, this is not
a legal requirement.160 An example of a case in which an applicant state challenged
an erga omnes violation is the Gambia-Myanmar Genocide case, which, at the time of
this writing, is pending before the ICJ.161 Gambia brought a claim against

151
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158
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Id. ¶ 88.
Genocide Convention, supra note 24, art. IX.
See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
Status of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, U.N.T.S.
(Dec. 30, 2020), https://perma.cc/Q6ZF-ET3F.
Id.
ICJ Statute, supra note 144, art. 34.
See Section III.A.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Gam.
v. Myan.), Provisional Measures, 2020 I.C.J. 8, ¶ 41 (Jan. 23) [hereinafter Gambia-Myanmar Genocide
case].
See Craig Eggett & Sarah Thin, Clarification and Conflation: Obligations of Erga Omnes in the Chagos
Opinion, EJIL:TALK! (May 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/ASW9-FNDR. Cf. Priya Urs, Obligations
Erga Omnes and the Question of Standing Before the International Court of Justice, 34 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
505 (Mar. 1, 2021).
See Eggett & Thin, supra note 159.
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gamia v.
Myanmar) I.C.J., https://perma.cc/GH8L-CBRV (last visited Dec. 28, 2021).
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Myanmar for Myanmar’s alleged genocide against the Rohingya people. 162 The
Court, in response to Gambia’s request for the indication of provisional measures,
emphasized that the absence of direct harm is not a bar to bringing an erga omnes
claim for a breach of the Genocide Convention:
[A]ll the States [P]arties to the Genocide Convention have a common interest
to ensure that acts of genocide are prevented and that, if they occur, their
authors do not enjoy impunity. That common interest implies that the
obligations in question are owed by any State party to all the other States
parties to the Convention . . . It follows that any State party to the Genocide
Convention, and not only a specially affected State, may invoke the
responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged
failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes [under the Genocide
Convention], and to bring that failure to an end. 163

It is possible that the Gambia-Myanmar Genocide case will proffer a feasible
path for more states to seek the enforcement of international law by bringing
claims of indirect harm. With the Court underscoring that direct injury need not
be present, the barriers to bringing forth erga omnes claims are now strictly political.
Given the right international relations conditions, a state’s calculus may tip in
favor of bringing a genocide claim on behalf of the Stolen Generations.

C. Declaratory and Monetary Relief Should Be Sought
The applicant state pursuing claims on behalf of the Stolen Generations
should seek reparation in the forms of satisfaction and compensation.
Satisfaction is a relatively straightforward form of relief: so long as Australia
is found to have breached its obligations under the Genocide Convention, the
Court will likely provide “a declaration in the [ ] Judgment that the Respondent [ ]
failed to comply with the obligation imposed by the Convention to prevent the
crime of genocide.”164
Securing compensation for the violation of a state’s responsibilities under
the Genocide Convention is a more difficult task. In principle, damages can and
162

163
164

See Gambia-Myanmar Genocide, supra note 158. “[A]gainst the backdrop of longstanding persecution
and discrimination,” in October 2016, Myanmar’s military and other security forces began
widespread and systematic “‘clearance operations’—the term Myanmar uses—against the Rohingya
group. The genocidal acts included mass murder, rape, and other forms of sexual violence, as well
as the systematic destruction by fire of their villages.” Application Instituting Proceedings and
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures (Gam. v. Myan.), Application, 2019 I.C.J. 2, ¶ 6
(Nov. 11). Since 2016, hundreds of thousands of Rohingya have fled across the border into
Bangladesh in what the U.N. has labeled a “textbook example of ethnic cleansing.” Myanmar
Rohingya: What You Need to Know About the Crisis, BBC NEWS (Jan. 23, 2020),
https://perma.cc/CY9P-3X8N.
Gambia-Myanmar Genocide, supra note 158, ¶ 41.
See Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 463
(Feb. 26) [hereinafter Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case].
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should be awarded for breaches of the Genocide Convention. The Court
acknowledges that “reparation must, so far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if the act had not been committed.”165 If restitution is not
possible, the Court should award an injured state monetary compensation for the
damages inflicted by a state that has engaged in an internationally wrongful act.166
But the Court has yet to award damages for breaches of obligations under
the Genocide Convention and imposes an additional requirement that must be
met before an applicant is to be awarded monetary compensation. The Court
requires a “sufficiently direct and certain causal nexus between the wrongful act,
the Respondent’s breach of the obligation to prevent genocide, and the injury
suffered by the Applicant . . . caused by the acts of genocide.”167 In effect,
applicants have the burden of establishing that genocide would not have occurred
but for the respondent state’s noncompliance with its legal obligations.168 If the
respondent state did not have the sufficient means to influence the direct
genocidal actor, a causal nexus is not proven and financial compensation is
considered inappropriate.169 The Court applied this reasoning to the Bosnia-Serbia
Genocide case, and concluded that while Serbia bore responsibility for failing to
prevent the Srebrenica massacre, Bosnia was not entitled to monetary
compensation as Serbia lacked “significant means of influencing the Bosnian Serb
military and political authorities”—the direct perpetrators of the massacre.170
Stolen Generations policies, Australia’s breach of the Convention in failing
to prevent genocide, and the injuries associated with forced removal likely meet
the nexus requirement. The direct perpetrators of forced removals were clearly
acting under the color of state and federal law, which likely violated Australia’s
obligations under the Convention. But for the systematic removal policies, First
Nations Australians would not have been separated from their families at as large
165

Id. ¶ 460.

166

See id.
Id. ¶ 462.
See id.
See id.
See id. The Court’s application of the nexus requirement has faced criticism. Notably, Christian
Tomuchat—a Professor of International Law at Humboldt University, former member of the U.N.
Human Rights Committee, and former Chairman of the U.N. International Law Commission—
argues that the ICJ should have shifted the standard of proof onto Serbia to prove that it was not
responsible for the actions of the Bosnian Serb Army of the Republika Srpska. Christian
Tomuschat, Reparation in Cases of Genocide, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 905 (2007). As the genocidal actions
were not unforeseen, Serbia should have taken initiative to prevent or otherwise avert the tragedy.
Id. at 908. Moreover, the relationship between the Government of the Former Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Republika Srpska authorities was shrouded in secrecy, so it would be unfair to
require the Applicant to prove that Serbia’s compliance with its Genocide Convention obligations
would have affected the outcome in Srebrenica. Id.
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a scale—a scale that threatened the very existence of Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander peoples. Therefore, an applicant state can and should seek declaratory
and monetary relief.

IV. M E RITS OF C LAIMS A GAINST A U STRALIA U NDE R THE
G E NOC IDE C ONVE NTION
The Genocide Convention defines genocide as:
[A]ny of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. 171

A. The Actus Reus of Article II(e) Has Been Met
Australia’s Stolen Generations policies incontrovertibly led to the forced
transfer of a substantial number of First Nations children to non-Indigenous
households and communities, which is prohibited by Article II(e) of the Genocide
Convention.
Article II(e) claims have yet to be brought before the ICJ, and some scholars
have argued that the provision is a “legal anachronism.”172 In early drafts of the
Convention, genocide was conceived as having physical, biological, and cultural
components.173 After significant debate, cultural genocide provisions, including
one prohibiting forced child transfer, were cut during the drafting process.174
Forced child transfer, however, was added back into the Convention’s final
draft.175 Some scholars have argued that forced child transfer was “strangely out
of place”176 and added “almost as an afterthought, with little substantive debate or
consideration.”177
However, forced child transfer, like other acts included in the Convention,
is an integral component of genocide. The Genocide Convention is intended to

176

Genocide Convention, supra note 24, art. 2.
Mundorff, supra note 100, at 62.
See id. at 75–77. See also supra note 128 and accompanying text.
See id.
See id.
LAWRENCE J. LEBLANC, THE UNITED STATES AND THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 115 (1991).

177

WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 175 (2000).
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provide broad, “affirmative protections for group viability.”178 It does more than
just stigmatize mass killings; four of the five acts of genocide the Convention
prohibits may be accomplished without the killing of a single individual.179
The forced child transfer provision was also thoroughly evaluated before its
adoption in the Convention’s final draft. A significant margin of delegates adopted
the amendment to re-include forced child transfer.180 The Greek delegate who
lobbied in favor of the amendment181 during the Sixth Committee of the U.N.
General Assembly182 persuasively argued that forcible child transfer was “not
primarily an act of cultural genocide . . . it could be perpetrated[ ] with the intent
to destroy or to cause serious physical harm to members of the group.” 183 The
French and American delegates, who had opposed the Convention’s inclusion of
cultural genocide, were amongst those voting in the amendment’s favor.
According to the French delegation, the forced transfer of children was a
“serious” and “barbarous” act with “physical and biological effects since it
imposed on young persons conditions of life likely to cause serious harm or even
death.”184 The American delegation felt that forced transfer was a “special case . . .
exception” to the exclusion of acts of cultural genocide.185
Forced child transfer also went against the weight of contemporary
international morality and law. At the Convention’s drafting, “awareness of the
importance of groups remained high,” and memories of Heinrich Himmler’s
campaign to steal and “Germanize” “racially valuable [Polish] children” had “not
yet faded.”186 One of the first convictions for the crime of genocide, in United
States v. Greifelt 187at Nuremberg, involved allegations against Nazi officials of
178
179

180

Mundorff, supra note 100, at 66.
See Genocide Convention, supra note 24, art. II(b)–(d) (providing for genocidal liability where
members of a group are caused serious “mental harm,” intentionally subjected to destructive life
conditions, or prevented from conceiving or giving birth to children.).
U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 3d. Sess. 182, 190, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.82 (Oct. 23, 1948).

187

At the time Greece had lobbied for the re-addition of the forced child transfer provision, Greece
was embroiled in a diplomatic struggle to secure the repatriation of thousands of Greek children
who had been taken by communist forces to the Balkans at the close of World War II. Greece
envisioned the charge of genocide would serve as a useful bargaining chip in ensuring the return of
these children. LEBLANC, supra note 176.
The two committees that did the most important work on the Convention included the Ad Hoc
Committee of the Economic and Social Council, and the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly.
Lawrence LeBlanc, The United Nations Genocide Convention and Political Groups: Should the United States
Propose an Amendment?, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 268, 270–71 (1988).
U.N. GAOR, supra note 180, at 188 (statement of Mr. Vallindas of Greece).
Id. at 186.
Id.
Mundorff, supra note 100, at 64, 79. See also SCHABAS, supra note 177.
Greifelt, supra note 96.
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Id. at 674.
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forced child transfer. In Greifelt, Prosecutor Neely remarked that “[t]he outrages
committed by the Nazis against the inhabitants of occupied countries” were
incredible: “the mass killing of the Jews, the atrocities in concentration camps, the
savage medical experiments, and many more ruthless forms of torture and
extermination practiced by the Nazi fanatics.”188 He continued, “[b]ut now we
turn to a crime which in many respects transcends them all . . . the crime of
kidnap[p]ing children.”189
Therefore, despite the relative underutilization of Article II(e) in practice,
forced child transfer, like that which occurred under the Stolen Generations
policies, is enough to confer genocidal liability.

B. Australia Likely Had Genocidal Intent
With the actus reus of genocide established, the next issue is whether Stolen
Generations policies were enacted with the intent to destroy First Nations
Australians. The mens rea for genocide is the intent to destroy a group in whole or
in substantial part—also referred to as the dolus specialis.190
Australian scholars arguing against the genocide hypothesis have focused on
the assimilative aims of government policies: because forced child transfers were
not intended to destroy Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, the
Australian government lacked the requisite genocidal intent. Dirk Moses, a
genocide scholar, argued that “[c]onservative commentators and the current
federal government . . . absolve[ ] the colonial and national governments of
responsibility, and [ ] insist[ ] that while the policies of child removal may have
been misguided by today’s standards, they were well intentioned.”191 Robert
Manne is one such conservative commentator. Manne, a professor of politics and
culture at La Trobe University, claimed that forced removal policies were not
genocidal: “assimilation has never been regarded in law as equivalent to
genocide.”192 Bain Attwood, a leading scholar in cross-cultural history, concurred,
arguing that “Aboriginal children were not separated by governments pursuing a
policy of genocide”—instead, assimilation efforts were “premised on the

188

Id. at 674.

189

Id.
See Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 164, ¶¶ 198–99. Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 150,
¶ 132.
Nuriyeni Kartika Bintarsari, The Cultural Genocide in Australia: A Case Study of the Forced Removal of
Aborigine Children from 1912-1962, 54 SHS WEB OF CONFS. 1, 4 (2018).
Sorensen & Wilson, supra note 11 (quoting Robert Manne). See generally Robert Manne, In Denial:
The Stolen Generations and the Right, 1 Q. ESSAY 1 (2001); Ron Brunton, Betraying the Victims: The ‘Stolen
Generations’ Report (IPA Backgrounder Vol. 10/1, 1998).
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assumption that this was for the good of Aboriginal people, an assumption that is
still prevalent in much of settler Australian culture today.”193
But many genocidal policies are shrouded in “benevolent intentions.” Just
because a perpetrator is able to frame a policy as having an intent other than to
destroy a group does not negate the genocidal quality of the perpetrator’s actions.
Perpetrators of genocide use euphemistic language to:
make their evil respectable and, in part, to reduce their personal responsibility
for it. By camouflaging their evil in innocuous ways or sanitizing jargon, the
evil loses much of its moral repugnancy. In this way, language can obscure,
mystify, or otherwise redefine acts of evil. 194

In the prototypical example of genocide, Nazis during the Holocaust cloaked
their barbarous actions in good intentions. The Holocaust was premised on
principles of eugenics—literally eu-(good) and -genos (birth).195 Rather than
acknowledging their actions as a campaign to massacre particular groups of
peoples, Nazis often claimed that their actions were targeted at reducing human
suffering through “‘breeding out’ . . . so-called undesirable characteristics from
the human population”—for example, one’s Jewish, Roma, Slavic or “Asiatic”
ethnicity.196 During the Holocaust, Nazis rarely used express genocidal language
for their Article II(a) acts; mass killing was labeled as “the final solution,” “special
treatment,” “evacuation,” “spontaneous actuations,” “resettlement,” and “special
installations.”197 Historian Raul Hilberg examined tens of thousands of Nazi
documents without ever encountering the word “killing.”198 But just because some
Nazis may have been able to articulate a “benevolent intent”—that is, one other
than the destruction of a group—does not mean that the intent to wipe out
various populations was not present or predominant. The drafters of the
Genocide Convention must have intended for the horrific acts committed during
the Holocaust to qualify as genocide under the Convention; the Convention was
created in response to the Holocaust to ensure that such heinous acts would
unambiguously violate international law, and legal consequences would stem as a
193

194

Cristopher Cook, The Stolen Generations: Competing Histories, 4 EMERGING SCHOLARS AUSTL.
INDIGENOUS STUD. 27 (2018), https://perma.cc/NL3L-TPXE.
JAMES WALLER, BECOMING EVIL: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE COMMIT GENOCIDE AND MASS
KILLING 211 (2007).

195

Eugenics (n.), ONLINE ETYMOLOGY DICTIONARY, https://perma.cc/SG5Y-HWRQ.

196

Mosaic of Victims: In Depth, HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/8783-68ER. Nazis rarely
used express genocidal language for their Article II(a) acts; mass killing was labeled as “the final
solution,” “special treatment,” “evacuation,” “spontaneous actuations,” “resettlement,” and
“special installations.” WALLER, supra note 194, at 211–12.
WALLER, supra note 194, at 211–12. But see Marko Milanović, State Responsibility for Genocide, 17 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 3, 553, 572–73 (2006) (sampling language expressing the intent to kill by Julius Streicher,
a Nazi sentenced to death by the International Tribunal at Nuremburg for crimes against humanity).

197

198

Years later, he eventually discovered the word, but in reference to an edict concerning dogs.
WALLER, supra note 194, at 212.
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result. Thus, alone, whether perpetrators thought they were doing a “good” thing
in perpetrating genocidal acts cannot reasonably obviate genocidal intent.
The Stolen Generations policies had similar express goals to the Holocaust:
if “undesirable characteristics”—color—could be “bred” out of Australian
society, the nation would “improve.”199 Extending the above analysis, the fact that
some Australians may have had “good intentions”200 does not exclude or excuse
the presence of a barbarous and “deliberate plan to breed the Aborigines out.”201
A more crucial issue is whether genocidal intent existed in Australia after the
Genocide Convention had taken effect; the answer implicates whether the Court
has jurisdiction to hear Stolen Generations claims. Given the statements of high
officials such as Neville and Cook, genocidal intent plainly appears in the 1930s. 202
According to Henry Reynolds, this intent likely continued through the 1940s.203
Paul Bartrop, the co-author of the Dictionary of Genocide, agreed.204 According
to Bartrop, “the use of the term genocide can be ‘sustained relatively easily’ when
describing the Stolen Generations,” both during and after the 1940s.205
Australia’s 1950s adoption of a national assimilation policy during the third
Native Welfare Conference206 should not be found to sever genocidal intent—
finding the contrary would defeat the object and purpose of the Convention. If a
statement suggesting an alternative intent for genocidal actions was sufficient to
transform acts of genocide into assimilation, then genocidal actors would always
have the option of retroactively obfuscating their intent to evade liability. If
erasing genocidal intent were this easy, the Genocide Convention would cease to
effectively constrain the reprehensible acts the Convention targets. The
Convention’s drafters could not have intended such a result. Instead, requiring a
199
200

201
202
203
204
205

206

See Section II.
Some Australians thought light-colored children “should be brought into white society and their
level of civilization raised”; other Australians felt the conditions in camps were bad, “as they were,”
so they reasoned that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children would benefit by being
removed from reservations. STOLEN GENERATIONS, supra note 30, 04:34–04:22.
Id.
See Section II.A.
See STOLEN GENERATIONS, supra note 30, 04:23–04:35.
See Sorensen & Wilson, supra note 11 (quoting Paul Bartrop).
Id. See also Paul Bartrop, The Holocaust, the Aborigines, and the Bureaucracy of Destruction: an Australian
Dimension of Genocide, 3 J. GENOCIDE RSCH. 75, 83 (2001) (“I am not convinced that the policy was
abandoned after 1940.”); PAUL BARTROP & SAMUEL TOTTEN, DICTIONARY OF GENOCIDE 29 (2008)
(finding that Australia’s policies of forced transference of those of part-Aboriginal descent to nonAboriginal environments which continued until the 1970s constituted genocide according to Article
II(e) of the Genocide Convention); Michael Perry, A Stolen Generations Cries Out, REUTERS (May 20,
1997), https://perma.cc/CZG6-AMXB (quoting Ronald Wilson as having said that the Stolen
Generations policies were attempted genocide as it was “believed that the Aboriginal people would
die out”).
BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 28. See also Section II.A.
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more forceful renunciation to cut off genocidal intent would be more consistent
with the Convention’s object and purpose. An analogy to criminal law is
instructive. Defendants are generally afforded a locus poenitentiae—an opportunity
to abandon an attempted crime by voluntary and complete renunciation before
the criminal act has occurred.207 Here, the genocidal actions continued—and an
assimilationist intent does not necessarily foreclose a genocidal intent. Therefore,
absent Australia’s clear denunciation of prior policies, the intent that existed prior
to the Native Welfare Conference—genocidal intent—continued: renunciation
was not complete.
Further, even if the adoption of assimilation as a national policy in the third
Native Welfare Conference amounted to complete renunciation, Australia could
be held liable for genocide. In January of 1951, the Genocide Convention took
effect, and Australia’s specific obligations under the Convention began. 208
However, Australia was most likely obligated to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of the treaty, such as committing genocide, from
the time it signed the Convention, in July of 1949.209 The Native Welfare
Conference—the first locus poenitentiae opportunity—took place in September of
1951.210 Therefore, Australia is responsible for any acts of genocide that occurred
from early 1951 (when the Genocide Convention took effect)—potentially even
from mid-1949 (when Australia signed the Convention)—until late 1951 (when
the third Native Welfare Conference took place).
Overall, there is a colorable claim that the Stolen Generations policies were
effectuated with the necessary genocidal intent.

C. Australia Violated Its Responsibility to Refrain from
Perpetrating Genocide
States must refrain from committing genocide. In 2007’s Bosnia-Serbia
Genocide case, the ICJ inferred that the Genocide Convention confers state
207

See, e.g., Gollan v Nugent (1988) 82 ALR 193, 205 (Austl.) (“[t]he law does not penalise intention. On
the contrary, it recognises a locus poenitentiae and assumes that the opportunity for repentance
may be exercised”). See also Taylor v. Bowers (1876), 1 QBD 291 (App. Cas.) (U.K.); Perpetual
Executors and Trustees Association of Australia Ltd. v Wright (1917) 23 C.L.R. 185 (Austl.); Spring Co. v.
Knowlton, 103 U.S. 49, 60 (1881); MPC § 5.01(4) (2019); Zimmerman v. Letkeman (1978) 79
D.L.R. (3d) 508, 522 (Can.); Watson v. Miles [1953] N.Z.L.R. 958, 969–71 (N.Z.).

208

Genocide Convention, supra note 24.
See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter
VCLT]. Though the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) entered into force in 1980,
the VCLT is a persuasive reflection of the state of customary international law and an instructive
tool in understanding and interpreting treaties. Australia has been a signatory to the VCLT since
1974. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, https://perma.cc/XU9UY6AY.
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BRINGING THEM HOME REPORT, supra note 6, at 28.
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responsibility for the crime of genocide, despite no express provision in the
Convention establishing state responsibility. The Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case
concerned Serbia’s alleged attempts to exterminate Bosnia and Herzegovina’s
Muslim population during the Bosnian war.211 Serbia contended that the Genocide
Convention only prescribed duties to prevent and punish genocide when
committed by non-state actors.212
The Court held that States Parties to the Genocide Convention are “bound
not to commit genocide, through the actions of their organs or persons or groups
whose acts are attributable to them.”213 The obligation of states to prohibit
genocide stems from Article I, read in light of the Convention’s purpose. Article I
states that the “Contracting Parties confirm that genocide . . . is a crime under
international law which they undertake to prevent and punish.”214 The
Convention’s preamble says that “The High Contracting Parties . . . [h]ereby agree
to prevent and punish the crime as hereinafter provided.”215 The Court reasoned that
because genocide is categorized as an international crime, the States Parties must
be undertaking not to commit the act described.216 Further, the obligation
expressly stated in the Convention to prevent genocide must indicate that states
are forbidden from committing genocidal acts through their own organs or
through persons over whom the state exercises such firm control as to make those
persons’ conduct attributable to the state.217 Essentially, the obligation to prevent
genocide implies the prohibition of its commission.
Although the perpetrators of the Stolen Generations policies are long
dead,218 their actions represented Australian policy. Australia can continue to be
held liable at the ICJ on a theory of state responsibility for its failure to refrain
from committing, preventing, and prosecuting genocide.

211

Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 164.

212

Id. ¶ 156.
Id. ¶ 167.
Genocide Convention, supra note 24, art. 1.
Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 164, ¶ 164 (emphasis in original).
Id. ¶ 161.
Id. ¶ 166.

213
214
215
216
217
218

There would be no statutory limitations bar to bringing forth a genocide claim. As state
responsibility is not itself criminal in nature, these claims are not subject to criminal procedural
requirements. Id. ¶ 170. Further, as suspect rights are not of concern when the perpetrator of a
wrongful act is a state, the conclusion that statutes of limitation do not apply is intuitive. One may
wonder whether such a conclusion—indefinite state responsibility—would be fair, but there is in
practice a limit for the occurrence of prosecution—the signing of the Genocide Convention.
Though genocide is a jus cogens violation that was likely illegal at the time of the Convention’s signing,
a state may only be held liable at the ICJ from the point in which that state consented to be bound
to the text of the Convention. See Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 150, ¶ 88.
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D. The Lack of
Irrelevant

Domestic

Implementing

Legisl ation

Is

Article V of the Genocide Convention requires States Parties to enact
necessary legislation to give effect to the Convention’s provisions, and “in
particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of
the other acts enumerated in [A]rticle III.”219 Australia did not pass legislation
making genocide a crime domestically until 2002. Some have argued that
implementing legislation was necessary to give the Convention domestic effect.220
Australia’s delay in passing implementing legislation cannot circumvent
Australia’s obligations under the Genocide Convention. Australia’s failure to pass
implementing legislation is certainly a breach of the country’s obligations under
the Convention. A breach, however, does not imply the treaty’s invalidity—which
would render the treaty as never having had legal effect.221 Instead, a breach
generally only allows for the treaty to be terminated—which affects the state’s
prospective obligations—and only by other states: a breach may not be invoked by
the breaching party to justify that state’s unilateral termination or suspension of

219

220

221

Genocide Convention, supra note 24, art. 5. Article III of the Convention specifies that acts of
genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to commit genocide, attempt
to commit genocide, and complicity in genocide shall be punishable. Id. art. 3.
Ben Saul suggested that the legislature, more concerned with domestic affairs than giving effect to
an international treaty, prioritized a domestic legislative agenda over passing the Convention’s
implementing statute. Ben Saul, The International Crime of Genocide in Australian Law, 22 SYD. L. REV.
527, 540 (2000). On the other hand, Shirley Scott, a lecturer of international law and international
relations at the UNSW Canberra, posited that Australia had not passed implementing legislation
due to sensitivity surrounding the Commonwealth’s constitutional power to implement treaties.
Shirley Scott, Why Wasn’t Genocide a Crime in Australia? Accounting for the Half Century Delay in Australia
Implementing the Genocide Convention, 10 AUSTL. J. HUM. RTS. 22, 201 (2004). The Australian
Constitution was unclear about whether the Commonwealth had the capacity to legislate to
implement treaties, particularly those treaties with subject matters that typically fell within the
jurisdiction of Australian states. Id. Moreover, the government felt that the Convention’s definition
of genocide was imprecise. Id. As a result, the government believed that it “would have to go beyond
the Convention in order to get a definition adequate for the purposes of criminal law.” Id. As time
went on, the issue of implementing legislation simply became “too hard.” Id. Domestic and
international pressure mounted in the 1980s and 1990s, leading Australia to eventually pass the
International Criminal Court (Consequential Amendments) Act 2000 to give effect to the crime of
genocide. Id. The Act was passed to implement the Rome Statute, but the definition of genocide
provided in the Rome Statute is the same as that given in the Genocide Convention. Accordingly,
some have interpreted the Act to be the necessary implementing legislation for the Genocide
Convention. See id.
A treaty will be declared invalid if it violates fundamental internal law in an objectively evident way,
the State is otherwise considered not to have consented to the treaty, there was an error in the basic
premise of the treaty, the treaty was signed under fraudulent or coercive circumstances, or the treaty
violated a jus cogens norm. A breach is not one of the bases for making a treaty void. See VCLT, supra
note 209, arts. 46–53, 60.
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the treaty. 222 No state, including Australia, has attempted to terminate or withdraw
from the Genocide Convention because of any alleged breach by Australia of the
treaty. Therefore, Australia’s lack of implementing legislation is irrelevant to its
obligations under the Convention.
Additionally, the Genocide Convention textually requires legislation be
enacted only if necessary to give effect to the Convention, and implementing
legislation was likely not necessary for Australia to be bound by the Convention.223
A treaty is an instrument of international law; states may require statutes to give
effect in domestic municipal law. However, a violation of state responsibility is an
international law rather than municipal offense and constrains states themselves
instead of private actors in domestic territories. Because obligations accrue to
states (the same parties bound by the treaty) and apply everywhere (regardless of
territory), implementing legislation is likely unnecessary to give effect to state
responsibility obligations.
Furthermore, the Convention could be considered part of Australian law
from its entry into force in the early 1950s until the High Court seemingly altered
its domestic legal effect in 1999. At the time of the Convention’s ratification, and
for a long while after, the crime of genocide was widely considered to be
incorporated into Australian law through common law and existing statutes;
therefore, there was no perceived need to criminalize genocide domestically.224
The Australian government appeared to adopt this position. When the
Commonwealth Government was asked about Australia’s stance on the domestic
force of the Genocide Convention in 1952, and then again in 1992, the official
response was that the laws already in force in Australia provided “substantially for
the punishment of the classes of acts described in the Convention.”225 It was only
222
223
224
225

See id. art. 60.
Genocide Convention, supra note 24, art. 5.
See Saul, supra note 220, at 541.
Scott, supra note 220 at 169. However, the departments of the Attorney General’s and External
Affairs expressed internal skepticism that genocide should be considered a domestic crime absent
implementing legislation. Id. at 164. It is also possible that the government did not fully weigh the
possibility of the Stolen Generations policies amounting to genocide, so took an uninformed stance
in publicly stating the Convention had effect in Australian law. Australia was perceived as a
“civilized country”—the notion that Australia would need to provide implementing legislation for
genocide was an offensive suggestion. Saul, supra note 220, at 540. “Nazi type ‘Final Solutions’”
could not occur in Australia, it was thought, so there was no need to implement obligations of the
Convention into domestic law. Timothy L. H. McCormack, Selective Reaction to Atrocity: War Crimes
and the Development of International Criminal Law, 60 ALB. L. REV. 681, 723–24 (1997). Some, such as
Shirley Scott, have also argued that “[t]he failure of the Australian government” to even consider
that national and state governments had committed genocide through its Stolen Generations
policies “confirms the shuttered vision and arrogance of White Australia towards Indigenous
Australians in the 1940s and 1950s.” Scott, supra note 220, at 174. Some have claimed that “[m]ore
than likely, some governments were afraid that accusations of genocide would be made against
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in 1999 that the Australian High Court in Nulyarimma indicated a contrary view:
that genocide was not incorporated into common law absent an implementing
statute.226 Judge Merkell, dissenting from the court in Nulyarimma, argued that the
weight of Australian law supported the Convention being automatically
incorporated into common law through Australia’s ratification of the treaty; in his
view, the Convention’s did not require implementing legislation to be executed in
Australia.227 Therefore, the Convention should be considered to have had
domestic effect during the relevant Stolen Generations period, before the High
Court’s abrupt shift away from the widespread, long-standing view of the
irrelevance of implementing legislation for domestic effect.

V. I SSU E S WIT H THE ICJ’ S J U RISP RU DE NC E
State responsibility is theoretically separate and distinct from criminal law,
which the ICJ recognizes to an extent.228 The Court states that “the responsibilities
of States that would arise from breach of [Genocide Convention] obligations [ ]
are obligations and responsibilities under international law. They are not of a
criminal nature.”229 The Court also recognizes that while state responsibility for
genocide can exist only if the predicate crime of genocide were committed, a
criminal conviction of genocide is not required for state attribution. 230 If a
conviction were required, the Court acknowledges that there would be no legal
recourse in many conceivable circumstances of genocide—for example, where
states, because of their complicity, refuse to prosecute their own individuals for
genocide.231
But the ICJ does not extend the distinction between the crime of genocide
and state responsibility far enough. The Court has imposed procedural
requirements on claims of state responsibility that should only apply in the
criminal context. First, the Court imposes the same “certainty” standard of proof
as is required in the criminal context; second, the Court establishes a test for
genocidal intent which requires that genocidal intent be the only reasonable
them by First Nations Australians for ‘child removal’ policies, and wanted to avoid legal
responsibility and compensation.” Saul, supra note 220, at 541. But see Scott, supra note 220, at 174
(concluding that the absence of implementation for the Genocide Convention “did not stem from
willful intent to commit with impunity acts of genocide against Indigenous Australians.”).
226

See Nulyarimma v. Thompson (1999) 165 ALR 621, 653 ¶ 131 (Austl.). See also supra Section II.B.

227

230

See id. See also generally Hon. Jus. Michael Kirby, The Growing Rapprochement Between International Law
and National Law, in VISIONS OF THE LEGAL ORDER IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS TO HONOUR
HIS EXCELLENCY JUDGE C. J. WEERAMANTRY (G. Sturgess & A. Anghie eds., 1995),
https://perma.cc/8GEG-5EUA.
See Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 164, ¶ 173.
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Id. ¶ 182.
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inference that may be drawn from the pattern of conduct.232 The requirements
imposed by the ICJ make it difficult to bring forth genocide claims, particularly
those reliant on Article II(e). In effect, the Court has, in the words of ICJ Judge
Cançado Trindade, “reduc[ed] genocide to an almost impossible crime to
determine, and the Genocide Convention to an almost dead letter.”233 The
situation of lawlessness, and “shadow of impunity,” is “contrary to the object and
purpose of the Convention.”234
“[T]here are reasons for the international criminal tribunals to adopt a
restrictive approach to the definition [of the crime of genocide] which are not
applicable when one considers State responsibility.”235 According to Judge Gaja in
a separate opinion in the Court’s Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, “certain aspects that
are specific to State responsibility appear to be underrated.”236 State responsibility
violations are of a civil nature, for example, warranting lower procedural
protections than would exist in a criminal context. Additionally, state
responsibility violations impose greater evidentiary burdens on applicants than
claims of criminality, due to the heightened difficulties in discerning intent and
accessing evidence on an equal basis with respondents.
This Comment argues that the ICJ should lower its standard of proof and
do away with the “only reasonable inference” intent test for claims of state
responsibility. Instead, the Court should implement a weight of the evidence test
for proving genocide, and a “reasonable inference” test for genocidal intent.
In hearing a claim on behalf of the Stolen Generations, the Court has the
opportunity to enact the recommended adjustments to its genocide jurisprudence.
This is the paradigmatic Article II(e) state responsibility case. While the claim of
genocide is contested,237 express genocidal intent—which is exceedingly rare in
genocide claims—clearly existed, unrebuked,238 and the removals occurred on an
extraordinary and unusually large scale.239 The Court can use this case to remedy
the shortcomings of its application of the Genocide Convention and expand its
ability to decide Article II(e) claims, which the Convention’s drafters envisaged as
qualifying as genocide. Moreover, the Court can grant the Stolen Generations a
chance to achieve recourse, symbolic or otherwise, for potentially genocidal
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See id. ¶¶ 208–09, 373. See also Croatia-Serbia Genocide Case, supra note 150, ¶ 407.
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Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 150, ¶ 143 (dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade).
Id. ¶ 148 (dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade).
Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 150, ¶ 2 (separate opinion of Judge Gaja).
Id.
For example, there are reasonable arguments that Australia lacked the requisite genocidal intent or
that the evidence establishing such intent is time-barred. See Section IV.B.
See Section IV.B.
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policies. The Court would also signal a commitment to upholding the letter of the
Convention and holding all states, no matter how “civilized,” accountable.

A. Too High a Standard of Proof
Claims of Australia’s Stolen Generations would likely fail to meet the
standard of proof established by the ICJ. To prove state responsibility for
genocide, the Court requires a “high level of certainty appropriate to the
seriousness of the allegation.”240 Because of the “exceptional gravity” of the claim,
the evidence must be “fully conclusive.”241 In effect, the ICJ requires that the
applicant state prove “beyond any reasonable doubt” that the respondent state
was responsible for genocide.242
Based on the evidence made publicly available, genocidal intent in the Stolen
Generations context may be strongly inferred. As previously discussed, in the
1930s, Australian officials tasked with implementing Aboriginal welfare policies
advocated for Aboriginals to be “bred out” of Australian society.243 The continued
removal of children in light of the government’s failure to explicitly renounce
prior-expressed genocidal intent244 strongly suggests the existence of genocidal
intent. However, the subsequent rhetorical shift of government actors in labeling
the child removal policies “assimilative” significantly muddles the intent inference.
The high standard the ICJ requires applicants to meet to prove genocidal
intent is not appropriate for state responsibility claims. State responsibility claims
were never intended to be “accompanied either by the due process guarantees
which must attach to findings of criminal responsibility or by the penal
consequences that such responsibility ought to entail,” according to James
Crawford, a current judge on the Court and former Special Rapporteur on State
Responsibility.245 Enforcement procedures, special sanctions, and the punishment
240

Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 164, ¶ 210.

241

Id. ¶¶ 208–09 (internal quotations omitted).
Andrea Gattini, Evidentiary Issues in the ICJ’s Genocide Judgment, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUS. 889, 889 (2007).
See Sections II.A, III.B.
See Section IV.B.
JAMES R. CRAWFORD, State Responsibility, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2006), https://perma.cc/7TR4-QHV2. Crawford was the International Law Commission’s Special
Rapporteur on State Responsibility from 1997–2001. During his tenure, in 2001, the ILC adopted
the Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [hereinafter Articles on
State Responsibility], a culmination of a 60-year project to codify this area of international law.
James Crawford, Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts: Historical Background
and Development of Codification, AUDIOVISUAL LIB. INT’L L., https://perma.cc/HLV8-S8NG. The ICJ
has held at least some of the Articles to be customary international law. See Bosnia-Serbia Genocide
case, supra note 164, ¶ 385. The final 2002 ILC Articles on State Responsibility rejected a proposal
to make an international crime of a “serious breach on a widespread scale of an international
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of offenders accompany criminal convictions.246 The classification of state
responsibility as a criminal offense would lead to untenable results. If convicted
of a crime, states would need to surrender authority and sovereignty to an
international court or other states serving the function of a “world police.”247
States might be required to pay sanctions above the amount required to restore an
injured party to the prior state.248 And states would be punished, which implies
correction, reform, deterrence, and incapacitation. Correction, reform, and
deterrence have clear corollaries in the state system, but incapacitation does not,
absent an extraordinarily costly blockade against a state convicted of criminal
behavior.249 The international community, recognizing that international law
functions better as a compensatory, rather than punitive, system, made state
responsibility a civil, not criminal, offense.250 Criminal law procedural protections,
such as the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, are designed to counterbalance
the high costs of criminal liability. Civil liability is relatively less costly, so criminal
law protections are inapplicable to civil state responsibility claims.251
Moreover, evidentiary burdens are inherently more difficult to meet in the
state responsibility context, warranting a lower standard of proof. In criminal law,
the intent of individual defendants may be deduced directly from statements on
the record. States, on the other hand, are inherently abstract actors, and evidence
of a state’s intent is often intangible and diffuse. More of a pattern of conduct is
required to construe intent; the statements of one politician will not necessarily
reflect the position of their government. States are also uniquely positioned to
obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the human being, such as those prohibiting
slavery, genocide, and apartheid.” Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Twenty-Eighth
Session, art. 19(3)(c), U.N. GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/31/10 (1976). Serbia,
relying on this drafting history, argued it could not be found guilty of the crime of genocide because
the Convention did not impose criminal liability for state responsibility violations. Bosnia-Serbia
Genocide case, supra note 164, ¶ 170. While conceding Serbia’s basic premise that state responsibility
was not criminal, the ICJ stated that the lack of criminal responsibility would not negate the
obligation of states not to commit genocide. Id.
246
247
248
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See Geoff Gilbert, The Criminal Responsibility of States, 39 INT’L & COMPAR. L. Q. 345, 350 (1990).
Id. at 351–52.
See Report by Mr. R. Ago, Chairman of the Sub-Committee on State Responsibility, [1963] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 227, 234, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/152.
See Gilbert, supra note 246, at 355.
See F.V. Garcia-Amador (Special Rapporteur), Rep. on International Responsibility [1956] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 173, 182 ¶ 47, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96 (citing DIONISIO ANZILOTTI, 1 CORSO DI DIRITTO
INTERNATIONALE 416 (Athenaeum, 3rd ed. 1929)). The ILC, in rejecting the criminal status of jus
cogens violations, and lowering the costs on states for breaches, rejected the application of criminal
procedural requirements to state responsibility claims. Crawford, supra note 245.
See Ruth Wedgwood, Bad Day for International Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2007),
https://perma.cc/V9QT-UUHL (“the International Court of Justice applies the demands of
criminal proof to a civil case. The judges insist that even for civil liability, proof against Belgrade
has to be ‘fully conclusive’ and ‘incontrovertible,’ with a level of certainty ‘beyond any doubt.’ This
standard is well known when the jail door will shut, but it exceeds the demands of civil liability.”).
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effectively obscure evidence of their wrongful acts. For grave breaches of human
rights, states have “control of the evidence or exclusive knowledge of some or all
of the events that took place.”252 By reason of the “exclusive territorial control
exercised by a State within its frontiers,” the applicant state seeking to establish a
breach of international law “is often unable to furnish direct proof of facts giving
rise to responsibility.”253 As a result, as noted by Judge Cançado Trindade in a
dissent in the Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, the Court imposing as high a threshold
of proof in state responsibility claims as criminal claims “discredit[s] the
production of evidence.”254
Further, the Court’s evidentiary requirements for genocide were established
without particular consideration of the unique challenges faced by applicants in
domestic genocides. The ICJ’s Bosnia-Serbia Genocide and Croatia-Serbia Genocide
cases, the only Genocide Convention judgments as of January 2022, considered
allegations of transnational genocide.255 The principal genocide allegations
concerned acts committed in the applicant states’ territories, so applicant states
had uninhibited access to physical evidence and testimony of local residents, and
could utilize their full domestic governmental apparatuses, to prepare their
cases.256 Moreover, the Yugoslav wars received extraordinary international
attention, in part due to their international effects; this benefited the collection
and preservation of evidence. The bloodshed spilled over into neighboring
countries and had the potential to destabilize the region, which triggered
international military intervention.257 The U.N. Security Council, in response to
the “threat to international peace and security,”258 created the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), providing for “extensive
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Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 150, ¶ 202 (dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade).
Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 164, ¶ 35 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President
Al-Khasawneh) (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 18).
Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 150, ¶ 202 (dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade).
At the time of this writing, the Court is considering its first “domestic” genocide case, though the
international spill-over effects of this alleged genocide are substantial. See Gambia-Myanmar Genocide
case, supra note 158.
In the Bosnia-Serbian Genocide case, Bosnia claimed Serbia committed genocide against Bosnians in
the Bosnian cities of Sarajevo and Srebrenica, as well as various detention camps set up in Bosnian
territory. Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 164, at 44–45. In the Croatia-Serbia Genocide case,
Croatia claimed that Serbia committed genocide against Croatians in Croatia’s Eastern Slavonia,
Western Slavonia, Banovina, Kordun, Lika, and Dalmatia regions. Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra
note 150, at 4–5. In contrast, Serbia’s counterclaim concerned Croatia’s actions against Serbians in
what is now the Croatian region of Krajina. Id. at 6.
See Clinton Addresses Nation on Yugoslavia Strike, CNN (Mar. 24, 1999), https://perma.cc/H7VG38JV.
S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).
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documentation and other evidence” from which Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia could
bring claims and counterclaims.259
Domestic genocides, however, present greater barriers for gathering
evidence. For domestic genocides, the applicant state represents, but is not itself,
the directly injured party. The burden is likely to initially fall on the directly injured
party, a group of individuals within a state, to gather strong evidence of genocidal
intent. A group of individuals lacks the same capacity and resources as states to
collect evidence. By the time the applicant state chooses to sponsor a group’s
claim—a risky endeavor given the political fallout and the relatively
unprecedented nature of alleging erga omnes violations—much of the evidence may
have been lost or destroyed. Moreover, for domestic genocides, the genocidal acts
occur wholly within the respondent’s territory. Therefore, the applicant state has
an inherently lesser ability to access the same evidence as the respondent state.
Additionally, there is likely to be less international attention and consequently less
international pressure for document preservation where the effects of a genocide
occur solely within one nation’s sovereign territory—such as the “island
continent” of Australia260—and do not produce destabilizing spill-over effects.
Applied to the Stolen Generations claims, evidentiary deficiencies make
establishing genocide with the requisite standard of proof particularly difficult.
Unlike in the Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case and the Croatia-Serbia Genocide case,
evidence of the Stolen Generations policies wholly rests with the respondent state:
Australia. The effects of the policies were confined territorially to the respondent
state, rather than some of the effects being felt in the applicant state’s territory.
Therefore, an applicant state will have inherently unequal access to evidence.
Moreover, Australia controlled the evidence and the narrative around the Stolen
Generations policies. There was little international attention, and it took decades
before a concerted effort was made to look into the potentially genocidal nature
of the policies; even at that point, this effort was made by the government. The
Australian Human Rights Commission’s Bringing Them Home Report essentially is
the historical record. It was released thirty-seven years after the last Stolen
Generations policy was repealed, so an extraordinary delay elapsed between the
Stolen Generations policies and the concerted attempt to preserve evidence.
Therefore, establishing genocide with “fully conclusive” evidence is virtually
impossible in this case but also for cases of domestic genocide generally.
259

260

See Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 164, ¶ 206. See also Ivo H. Daalder, Decision to Intervene: How
the War in Bosnia Ended, BROOKINGS (Dec. 1, 1998), https://perma.cc/2K74-NZK4. Julie Malá,
International Intervention in Croatia During the Yugoslav Wars, E-INT’L RELATIONS (Sept. 16, 2011),
https://perma.cc/GU8W-TKDU.
The “island continent” is a slight misnomer as Australia is too large to be an island, John M.
Cunningham, Is Australia an Island?, BRITANNICA, https://perma.cc/7AKY-3ZPM, but the point
remains that Australia is entirely surrounded by water, which limits potential international effects
of Australian domestic policies.

Winter 2022

697

Chicago Journal of International Law

Where genocide claims rely on state responsibility, and particularly where
genocide has occurred solely in the territory of the respondent state and the
directly harmed persons are individuals who for many years have lacked the
capacity and resources to collect strong evidence of genocidal intent against their
state, it becomes virtually impossible to prove genocide with near certainty. 261
Without lowering the threshold of proof, the ICJ renders Article II(e) of the
Genocide Convention an empty provision, contradicting the Convention’s clear
aim of punishing all enumerated acts of genocide.
The standard of proof should accordingly be lowered. Judge Al-Khasawneh
of the ICJ suggests that the applicant state should be afforded a “more liberal
recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.”262 Judge Cançado
Trindade argues that a “simple balance of evidence,” instead of near certainty,
would be “appropriate.”263 The Court could borrow a similar balancing test to the
one helpfully articulated by the ICTY in Prosecutor v. Tolimir.264 The ICTY in Tolimir,
an international criminal case, held that the “objective probability” that the
imposed conditions of life will lead to the physical destruction of a group should
be considered when inferring genocidal intent.265 The intent to destroy is “rarely
overt,” so a balance of factors should be weighed, including:
(a) “the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts
systematically directed against that same group”, whether committed “by the
same offender or by others”; (b) “the scale of atrocities committed”; (c) the
“general nature” of the atrocities committed “in a region or a country”; (d)
“the fact of deliberately and systematically targeting victims on account of
their membership of a particular group, while excluding the members of other
groups”; (e) “the general political doctrine which gave rise to the acts”; (f)
“the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts”; and (g) “the
perpetration of acts which violate, or which the perpetrators themselves
consider to violate the very foundation of the group—acts which are not in
themselves covered by the list [of relevant statutorily prohibited acts] but
which are committed as part of the same pattern of conduct.”266

The ICTY only then said that “[t]he existence of a plan or policy [or] a
perpetrator’s display of his intent through public speeches or meetings with others
261
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See Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 150, ¶ 120 (dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade)
(internal citations omitted).
Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 164, ¶ 35 (dissenting opinion of Vice-President
Al-Khasawneh) (citing Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 18).
Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 150, ¶ 138 (dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade).
Case No. IT-05-88/2-T, Judgment, ¶ 745 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Dec. 12,
2012).
Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 150, ¶ 128 (dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade)
(internal citations omitted).
Id. ¶ 130 (dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade) (internal citations omitted). See also
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 523 (Sept. 2, 1998) (“intent is a mental
factor which is difficult, even impossible, to determine”).
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may also support an inference that the perpetrator had formed the requisite
specific intent.”267 Essentially, the weighing of circumstantial evidence and a
general pattern of genocidal behavior was enough to find the existence of
genocide—the ICTY did not require a smoking gun, even in a criminal context.
Under a Tolimir-style balancing test, genocidal intent could likely be inferred
in the Stolen Generations policies. Applying the Tolimir test, the Stolen
Generations policies were systemically directed towards Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Islander children (part (a)). The policies had a widespread effect: between
one-tenth and one-third of First Nations children were forcibly removed from
their households (part (b)).268 Forced removals occurred generally, throughout the
country (part (c)). The children were removed because they were Indigenous; for
non-Indigenous children to be removed from their families, a much more
stringent requirement of court-determined negligence needed to be met (part
(d)).269 The removals were initially conceived as part of a broader scheme to “breed
out color” and “improve” Australian society (part (e)). For decades, the removals
occurred frequently (part (f)) and were part of a pattern of discriminatory
governmental acts aimed at controlling and subjugating First Nations
communities (part (g)).270
Therefore, by lowering the standard of proof and allowing genocidal intent
to be inferred from a weight of the evidence, Australia may be held to account for
its likely breach of the Genocide Convention.

B. Too High a Test for Genoc idal Intent
The ICJ has developed an unduly burdensome test for finding genocidal
intent in state policies. In the Croatia-Serbia Genocide case,271 the Court held that the
applicant must first seek evidence of genocidal intent in the respondent state’s
policy.272 “In the absence of a State plan expressing the intent to commit
genocide,” intent may be inferred from a pattern of conduct, but genocidal intent
267
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Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 150, ¶ 135 (dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade)
(internal citations omitted).
See Section II.A.
See id.
See id.
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The Croatia-Serbia Genocide case was brought by Croatia for alleged acts of genocide that occurred
during the Croatian War of Independence. Croatia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 150, ¶ 50. Serbia
counterclaimed that Croatia had also committed genocide during this period. Id. ¶ 51. The Court
found that the Serbian-led forces attacked and occupied localities, created a climate of fear and
displaced Croat and non-Serb populations through persecutions. Id. ¶ 415. However, the Serbian
led-forces’ objective was primarily to establish an ethnically Serb territory. Id. ¶ 420. Therefore, as
genocidal intent was not the only reasonable inference to be drawn, the mens rea of genocide could
not be inferred. Id. ¶ 435.
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must be the “the only reasonable inference to be drawn from that conduct . . .”273
In effect, the “only reasonable inference” analysis is the only test for genocidal
intent. Genocidal intent is rarely stated in official policy or plans, a truth
acknowledged by the ICJ’s then-Vice-President Al-Khasawneh.274 Instead, intent
is usually elusive and “carefully concealed.”275 ICJ Judge Cançado Trindade
claimed that, over the course of the twentieth century, successive genocides and
atrocities demonstrate that state policies “use [ ] euphemistic language” in
genocidal policies, “dehumaniz[ing] [ ] the victims.”276 Intent may also be
particularly difficult to establish when the perpetrator of genocide is a state. To
infer the intent of a state—an abstract entity—a wealth of conflicting evidence,
such as the contradictory statements of two politicians, is relied upon. Distilling
only one reasonable intent becomes an almost impossible task.
The Stolen Generations policies would likely fail to meet the ICJ’s test for
inferring genocidal intent. As previously discussed, the forced child transfer
policies were at least partially premised on assimilative aims.277 The goal of
assimilation has much support in the evidentiary record. 278 Therefore, genocidal
intent is not the only reasonable intent that can be inferred from these policies.
The “only reasonable inference” test for genocidal intent would also cause
Article II(e) acts to broadly be under-adjudicated, in contravention of the object
and purpose of the Genocide Convention. Alternative intent arguments are
persuasive in almost all Article II(e) claims: it is straightforward to claim benign
motives for forcibly transferring the children of one group to another. Heinrich
Himmler, during his campaign to transfer “racially valuable” Polish children to
German families in World War II, justified the forced separation as necessary for
the health and wellbeing of the children.279 The eventual support of the Sixth
Committee’s inclusion of forced child transfer in the text of Article II280 is likely
partially attributed to the delegates’ fresh memories of Himmler’s forced child
transfers during World War II.281 The exclusion from genocidal liability of acts like
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See Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, supra note 164, Summary of the Judgment, 2 (opinion of
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those perpetrated by Himmler, therefore, could not have been an intended result
of the Convention’s application.
Even under Article II(a), the prototypical “mass killing” genocide scenario,
the Court’s test produces unsatisfactory results. The ICJ held that the Vukovar
massacre, considered one of the “most brutal episodes of the Balkans wars,” was
not a genocide because the only reasonable inference for the Serbian attack was
not the physical destruction of those Croatians who were killed.282 In Vukovar,
which bordered Croatia and Serbia, hundreds of people, including the families of
hospital staff and some Croatian soldiers, had sought shelter in a hospital after the
city fell following a three-month siege.283 These people believed they would be
evacuated in the presence of international observers.284 Local armed Serbs entered
the hospital and transported many of those sheltered in the hospital (mostly
Croats) to a farm.285 At least 264 people were shot at the farm and buried in a mass
grave.286 The ICJ concluded there was no genocidal intent, as the attack was
animated by political and/or retributive motives. Judge Bhandari, in a separate
opinion, wrote that the Court had committed “a basic error of law.”287 Judge
Bhandari argued that “genocidal intent may exist simultaneously with other, ulterior
motives.”288 Judge Bhandari also claimed that the finding in the ICTY’s Popović case
that the massacre at Srebrenica, which the Court held constituted genocide in its
prior Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case, would have come out the other way had the Court
applied the “only reasonable inference” test: “[T]he massacre at Srebrenica
enclave was in part motivated by the strategic advantage of uniting a ‘Greater
Serbia.’ Never was it suggested that this tactical motivation precluded the attack
from possessing genocidal intent.”289
Furthermore, the Court’s “only reasonable inference” test is internally
inconsistent with the Court’s other reasoning, specifically regarding ethnic
cleansing. The Court held in the Bosnia-Serbia Genocide case that ethnic cleansing
campaigns could amount to genocide, but not always, as forced displacement does
not necessarily mean that the state intended to destroy the group.290 Destruction
is also not an automatic consequence of displacement.291 In the case that
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established the “only reasonable inference” requirement, the Croatia-Serbia Genocide
case, the Court reiterated this earlier principle from the Bosnia-Serbia Genocide
case—that the intent of a state to render an area “ethnically homogenous” would
not alone suffice for genocide. 292 But under the Court’s “only reasonable
inference” test, because a smoking gun hardly ever exists, virtually every ethnic
cleansing action would fail to amount to genocide.
If, instead, the Court adopts a “reasonable inference” or “most reasonable
inference test,” genocidal intent may be inferred where other coextensive intents
exist. This easier-to-meet test for genocidal intent would allow for genocidal intent
to be inferred in contexts in which it plainly should exist: for example, for ethnic
cleansing events like the Vukovar and Srebrenica massacres, and for Article II(e)
claims like Himmler’s conduct in World War II and Australia’s Stolen Generations
policies.

VI. C ONC LU SION
This Comment examined whether Australia could be haled into the
International Court of Justice on a genocide claim for its Stolen Generations
policies. There is a plausible claim of genocide (Section IV). While there would
likely not be a procedural bar to hearing such a claim (Section III), the case would
almost undoubtedly be decided in favor of the Australian government. However,
this Comment argues that the Court’s existing jurisprudence is flawed, especially
as applied to the Stolen Generations policies. The ICJ should consider revising its
position on the standard of proof and the test for genocidal intent, especially
because the existing standards would effectively foreclose Article II(e) claims such
as the one that could be brought on behalf of the Stolen Generations (Section IV).
This Comment recommended that the Court lower the standard of proof and the
threshold for establishing genocidal intent. If the Court were to adopt these
changes, it will allow claims reliant on Article II(e), such as Stolen Generations
claims, to be meaningfully adjudicated. In so doing, the Court can better align its
reasoning with the purposes of the Genocide Convention.
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